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TWELVE
Filtering the Flow from the Fountains 
of Knowledge: 
Access and Copyright in Education and Libraries
Margaret Ann Wilkinson*
A.	 INTRODUCTION
Since 1997 the Canadian Copyright Act has contained specific exceptions 
to the rights of copyright holders which are only available to defined, tar-
geted institutions. As recently as March 005, in their joint Government 
Statement on Proposals for Copyright Reform, the Ministers of Industry and 
Heritage signalled an intention to continue singling out particular insti-
tutions for special treatment under the copyright regime. The recent Bill 
C-60 further demonstrates this intent. Given the current minority gov-
ernment,5 it remains uncertain whether the proposed enactments will be 
* The author would li�e to than� law student �ordan Cutler for research support             
in the preparation of this chapter. The author’s research is supported through 
the Social Sciences and Humanities Council of Canada.
1 This chapter discusses the Canadian copyright environment as at 1 �uly 005.
 Copyright Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-. <http://laws.justice.gc.ca/en/C->.
 Canada, Ministries of Industry and Canadian Heritage,       Government Statement 
on Proposals for Copyright Reform (March 005). <http://pch.gc.ca/progs/ac-ca/
progs/da-cpb/reform/statement_e.cfm> [Statement].
 Bill C-60,  An Act to amend the Copyright Act, 1st Sess., 7th Parl., 005, 1st session, 
8th Parliament, First reading 0 �une 005. <www.parl.gc.ca/8/1/parlbus/
chambus/house/bills/government/C-60/C-60_1/C-60-E.html>.
5 The final distribution of the 08 seats after the election was: �iberals 15 seats,              
Conservatives 99, Bloc Quebecois 5 (all from the province of Quebec), and New 
Democratic Party 19. Also elected was 1 independent member, from British 
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enacted. Nonetheless, it is important to discuss and comment upon the 
ongoing approach of government to limit certain copyright exceptions to 
particular institutional contexts. 
Not only are its reforms to be limited to particular institutional con-
texts, but the Government Statement also declared that “[t]he Govern-
ment supports the use of leading-edge technologies in education and 
research” and, therefore, that the proposed federal bill introducing copy-
right change “will propose certain measures that will facilitate the use of 
the Internet for these purposes” [emphasis added]. on the other hand, 
the government has deliberately refrained from ma�ing other proposals 
in this connection. one such absence occurs in the area of the Statement 
headed “Educational use of Publicly Available Internet Material.” In this 
area, the Statement points to the need for further consideration of “the 
implications of recent copyright decisions by the courts (notably the re-
cent Supreme Court of Canada decision regarding fair dealing, CCH v. Law 
Society of Upper Canada)” before policy can be proposed. It is the argument 
of this chapter that the implications of recent decisions of the Supreme 
Court of Canada are much wider than the Government appears to believe 
and that analysis of these decisions remains an important factor in con-
sidering the proposals which the Government is putting forward, as well 
as in considering the issues which the Government proposes to defer. The 
chapter concludes by demonstrating that two of the proposed amend-
ments in these areas are probably unnecessary, given the current state of 
the law, and the third is probably ill-timed and may also be ill-conceived.
B.	 BACKGROUND
In the 1980s there was a large round of consultations on copyright in ot-
tawa, which culminated in an important series of position papers.6 out of 
Columbia (who has since died of cancer, leaving a vacancy). Since 155 seats are 
needed to dominate the House, this has been a very interesting, if potentially 
short-lived, Parliament. Already the distribution of seats has changed, through 
defections, resignations and death. As of �uly 005, the distribution is: �iberals 
1 (through three defections — to sit as Independents — and one death and 
then success in one by-election and one defection from the Conservatives); Con-
servatives 98, Bloc Quebecois unchanged at 5, NDP unchanged at 19, Indepen-
dents now  plus 1 vacancy.
6 The first federal discussion paper was      From Gutenberg to Teledon: A Guide to Can-
ada’s Copyright Revision Proposals (ottawa: Government of Canada,Consumer 
and Corporate Affairs, Department of Communications, 198), which 
was followed by A Charter of Rights for Creators (ottawa: Government of 
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this process, however, the first tangible statutory changes occurred only in 
1988 and these changes, generally, enhanced the position of rightsholders 
in the copyright environment.7 one consequence of the reforms of 1988 
has been the rapid creation and growth of collective societies representing 
the rightsholders of different aspects of the range of copyright interests 
originally bestowed by the Copyright Act. Prior to 1988, the two collectives 
then active in the music industry were the only major players of this type 
in the copyright policy environment.8 Now there are many.9
As the decade of the 1980s passed with no sign of the anticipated “Phase 
” legislative reforms, which it was thought would address users’ perspec-
tives, those groups who had participated in the consultations represent-
ing the perspectives of information users and intermediaries, rather than 
copyright owners, were disappointed and disillusioned by the process.10 
However, lobbying efforts continued, aimed at getting the federal govern-
Canada,Parliament, House of Commons, Sub-Committee on the Revision of 
Copyright, 1985).
 7 For example, up until 1988, most copyright holders were discouraged from           
engaging in collective administration of their rights because of the threat of 
anti-combines prosecution pursuant to the Competition Act, R.S.C.1985, c. C-
. In 1988, however, s. 70.5() of the Copyright Act was added which provides: 
“Section 5 of the Competition Act does not apply in respect of any royalties or 
related terms and conditions arising under an agreement filed in accordance 
with subsection ().” Immediately two large print collectives became very active 
in Canada: CANCoPy (which was incorporated as a federal non-profit organiza-
tion in August, 1988), now AccessCopyright, for English language materials and 
uNEQ, now CoPIBEC, for French language materials.
 8 The Composers, Authors, and Publishers Association of Canada (CAPAC) and          
the Performing Rights organization of Canada (PRoCAN). with origins as 
early as 195, the two joined together in 1990 to form the Society of Composers, 
Authors, and Music Publishers of Canada (SoCAN).
 9 CANCoPy, now AccessCopyright, Christian Copyright �icensing Inc., Neigh-       
bouring Rights Collective of Canada, and so on. The Copyright Board of Canada 
maintains a list at <www.cb-cda.gc.ca/societies/index-e.html>.
10 In the controversy following the appearance of the        Charter of Rights for Creators, 
groups representing user interests were persuaded that copyright reform was 
being pac�aged as a two-phase process. The first phase was to be Bill C-60 
which, when enacted in 1988, created the amendments to the Copyright Act that 
largely favoured copyright owners. A second phase was promised, which was 
to focus on the needs of information users and intermediaries. The promised 
second phase, however, failed to appear in a timely manner. See �inda Hansen, 
“The Half-circled “C”: Canadian Copyright �egislation,” (199) 19 Government 
Publications Review 17. 
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ment to enhance the position of users of copyrighted material under the 
statute.11 
At about the same time, however, changes were ta�ing place in terms of 
Canada’s international obligations in copyright. The North American Free 
Trade Agreement [NAFTA],1 concluded between Canada, the united States, 
and Mexico in 199, opened a new chapter in international relationships 
involving copyright.1 For the first time, Canada was involved in a more 
binding international trade agreement that included intellectual property 
(Chapter 17 of NAFTA). Although Canada had long been a voluntary mem-
ber of the Berne Convention1 on copyright, NAFTA has brought copyright 
into an arena of possible trade sanctions for non-compliance, a level of 
enforcement of Canada’s international copyright obligations that had not 
11 For example, the National Information Summit in ottawa in 199 was or-           
ganized by the Canadian �ibrary Association (C�A) and its francophone 
counterpart, �’Association pour l’Avancement des Sciences et des techniques 
de la Documentation (AStED), involving 171 delegates and 71 observers. As 
further evidence of these ongoing efforts, on the bac� cover of her Demystify-
ing Copyright: A Researcher’s Guide to Copyright in Canadian Libraries and Archives 
(ottawa: Canadian �ibrary Association, 001), �ean Dryden is described as 
having “played a lead role in successful lobbying for exceptions for libraries, 
archives, and museums during the discussions leading to the 1997 amendments 
to the Copyright Act.” This period of copyright policy development coincided 
with a period of intense government activity focused on the goal of developing 
a national information policy. The notion of the “information highway” was 
prominent in Canada. My former student Daniel Dorner won the American 
Society for Information Science Doctoral Dissertation Award for his empirical 
doctoral research which established, amongst other findings, that during this 
period Industry Canada held a far stronger policy influencing position than 
did its counterpart Canadian Heritage: see Daniel G. Dorner, “The Essential 
Services Policy Networ�: organizational Influence in Canada’s Information 
Highway Policy Development Process,” (00) 7 �ibrary Quarterly: 7.
1 North American Free Trade Agreement, Canada, Mexico and the United States, 17 
December 199, Can. t.S. 199 No.  (entered into force 1 �anuary 199) <www.
NAFtA-sec-alena.org/DefaultSite/index_e.aspx?CategoryId=>.
1 Although Canada and the united States had concluded the         Free Trade Agreement 
in 1989, it did not affect copyright as it contained no provisions governing intel-
lectual property. Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement, Canada and united States,  
october 1987, (entered into force 1 �anuary 1989) <www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/tna-
nac/documents/cusfta-e.pdf>.
1 Note that although Canada’s first and only       Copyright Act has been Berne-compli-
ant since coming into force in 19, the latest version of the Berne Convention 
which Canada had signed prior to 199 was the 198 Rome version; Canada 
declined to sign the 198 Brussels, 1967 Stoc�holm, or 1971 Paris versions until 
its obligations under NAFTA and TRIPS changed its views. 
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previously been part of Canada’s copyright policy environment. In par-
ticular, Article 1705(5) of NAFTA provides
Each Party shall confine limitations or exceptions to the rights pro-
vided for in this Article to certain special cases that do not conflict 
with a normal exploitation of the wor� and do not unreasonably prej-
udice the legitimate interests of the right holder.15
 Although copyright continues to be a responsibility shared between 
the Heritage and Industry ministers,16 it has become now also of greater 
concern in Foreign Affairs and International trade portfolios.17 Immedi-
ately after becoming party to NAFTA, Canada was a founding member of 
the world trade organization and, as such, a party to the Trade-Related 
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights Agreement [TRIPS].18 under this 1995 
agreement, Article 1 provides:
Members shall confine limitations or exceptions to exclusive rights
– to certain special cases
– which do not conflict with a normal exploitation of the wor�
– and do not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the 
right holder.
15 North American Free Trade Agreement, Canada, Mexico and the United States, 
17 December 199, Can. t.S. 199 No.  (entered into force 1 �anuary 
199), Article 1705(5). <www.NAFtA-sec-alena.org/DefaultSite/index_
e.aspx?CategoryId=>.
16 David Emerson is currently Industry Minister, in his first term as an elected             
Member of Parliament and formerly Chief Executive officer of Canfor, British 
Columbia’s largest forestry company. It was speculated in the Canadian press, 
when Cabinet was named, �uly 19, 00, that he has been brought into cabinet, 
in part, to represent the interests of big business. �iz Frulla is Minister of Ca-
nadian Heritage and Minister responsible for the Status of women. A member 
of Parliament only since 00, commentators have viewed her appointment 
to Heritage variously, as a fast-trac� advancement or as an indication of de-
emphasis on the Heritage portfolio. A former television host, Ms. Frulla has 
also previously been Minister of Social Development and Quebec’s Minister of 
Culture.
17 The Minister of Foreign Affairs now is Pierre Pettigrew, formerly federal Min-           
ister of Health. �im Peterson, who had been Minister of International trade, 
has remained in that portfolio. In the recent past, this portfolio has been a 
combined one, administered through the Department of Foreign Affairs and 
International trade.
18 (199),  I.�.M.1197. <www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/7-trips_01_e.htm>.   
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This is a mandatory provision, and, while other provisions might appear 
to ameliorate the demands of this section, they are couched only in per-
missive terms.19 
TRIPS also incorporates by reference the provisions of the Berne Con-
vention in its 1971 version, which Canada has now also signed,0 indepen-
dent of its wto membership. Article 9 of the Berne Convention provides:
(1) Authors of literary and artistic wor�s protected by this Conven-
tion shall have the exclusive right of authorizing the reproduc-
tion of these wor�s, in any manner or form.
() It shall be a matter for legislation in the countries of the union 
to permit the reproduction of such wor�s in certain special 
cases, provided that such reproduction does not conflict with 
the normal exploitation of the wor� and does not unreasonably 
prejudice the legitimate interests of the author.
These new trade obligations in copyright appear to have had a great im-
pact on government attitudes toward enlarging exceptions to the rights 
of copyright holders since such amendments now need to be assessed in 
light of their possible impact in the trade context. Given the longevity and 
strength of the publishing industry focused on the education sector, par-
ticularly the involvement of foreign publishers in this mar�et in Canada, it 
might be difficult to establish that broad exemptions in this sector would 
“not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the author.”1 Thus 
the environment of consideration of copyright reform that had existed in 
the 1980s, when the “Phase I” copyright reforms occurred, was vastly dif-
ferent after 199 and 1995 (and continues to be different); and the “Phase 
” reforms were still in abeyance.
19 Article 8, in particular, provides    
1. Members may …  adopt measures necessary …  to promote the public in-
terest in sectors of vital importance to their socio-economic and techno-
logical development, provided that such measures are consistent with the 
provisions of this Agreement.
2. Appropriate measures, provided that they are consistent with this Agree-
ment, may be needed 
 – to prevent the abuse of intellectual property rights by right holders or
 – the resort to practices which
  • unreasonably restrain trade or
  • adversely affect the international transfer of technology.
0 Canada signed the 1971 Paris version of the        Berne Convention in 1998.
1 Referring to the language in Art. 9 of the         Berne Convention, just quoted.
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Eventually, in 1997, special exceptions to the rights of copyright for (1) 
“educational institutions” and () “libraries, archives and museums” were 
added to the statute. However, these additional exceptions did not repre-
sent a universal triumph for the communities of educational institutions 
or of libraries, archives, and museums. Indeed, they split these communi-
ties because the exceptions created can only be enjoyed by those defined 
within the Copyright Act as members of each community.
with respect to educational institutions, only those defined as an “edu-
cational institution” in the Act enjoy the privileges of the exemptions in 
the Act, that is: 
(a) a non-profit institution licensed or recognized by or under an 
Act of Parliament or the legislature of a province to provide pre-
school, elementary, secondary or post-secondary education,[or]
(b) a non-profit institution that is directed or controlled by a board 
of education regulated by or under an Act of the legislature of 
a province and that provides continuing, professional or voca-
tional education or training,[or]
(c) a department or agency of any order of government, or any non-
profit body, that controls or supervises education or training re-
ferred to in paragraph (a) or (b), or
(d) any other non-profit institution prescribed by regulation.
with respect to the three communities of libraries, archives, and mu-
seums, which are actually quite separate communities in their own eyes, 
the statute has lumped those who will enjoy the statutory exceptions to-
 S.C. 1997, c. . The amendments with respect to “libraries, archives, and            
museums” did not come into effect until 1 September 1999. other than the case 
of CCH v. Law Society of Upper Canada, 00 SCC 1 <www.canlii.org/ca/cas/scc/
00/00scc1.html>; [00] S.C.R. 9, S.C.�. No.1, [00] [CCH et al v. Law 
Society of Upper Canada cited to S.C.R.], these provisions do not appear to have 
been tested in court: there are no reported cases.
 Copyright Act, above note , s. .
 The libraries have been generally represented at the national level by the Cana-            
dian �ibrary Association as well as through the National �ibrary, the archivists 
by the Bureau of Canadian Archivists and through the National Archivist. 
Recently, the two national institutions of the National �ibrary and the National 
Archives have been merged into one institution headed by the �ibrarian and 
Archivist of Canada. See Library and Archives of Canada Act, S.C. 00, c.11, 
<http://laws.justice.gc.ca/en/�-7.7/>.
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gether into one definition (now popularly referred to as “�AMs,” a term 
that will be used in the remainder of this chapter):5
 “library, archive or museum” means
(a) an institution, whether or not incorporated, that is not estab-
lished or conducted for profit or does not form a part of, or is 
not administered or directly or indirectly controlled by, a body 
that is established or conducted for profit, in which is held and 
maintained a collection of documents and other materials that 
is open to the public or to researchers, or
(b) any other non-profit institution prescribed by regulation.6
During the period of the last Parliament there were indications of leg-
islative initiative in copyright, which culminated in the May 00 Interim 
Report on Copyright Reform [00 Interim Report].7 The 00 Interim Report 
specifically discussed technology-enhanced learning8 and pointed out 
the copyright challenges “when information and communications tech-
5 In its recent decision involving the �aw Society of upper Canada, the Supreme             
Court of Canada went out of its way to point out that the Great �ibrary of the �aw 
Society of upper Canada is a library which would fall under the purview of these 
exceptions, despite the fact that the facts of the case arose before the passage of 
these exceptions and so they did not apply in the case at bar before the Court. The 
Court found: “The Great �ibrary is not established or conducted for profit. It is 
administered and controlled by the Benchers of the �aw Society. Although some 
of the Benchers, when acting in other capacities, practice law for profit when they 
are acting as administrators of the Great �ibrary, the Benchers are not acting 
as a body established or conducted for profit.” (CCH et al. v. Law Society of Upper 
Canada, above note , at para. 8.) As the Court phrases it (CCH et al. v. Law Soci-
ety of Upper Canada at para. 8), to enjoy these exceptions, a library
– must not be established or conducted for profit;
– must not be administered or controlled by a body that is established or 
conducted for profit; and
– must hold and maintain a collection of documents and other materials 
that is open to the public or to researchers.
6 Copyright Act, above note , s. .
7 The process of copyright reform underway before the election is fully described            
in the recent House of Commons Standing Committee on Canadian Heritage 
Interim Report on Copyright Reform, released May 00. Sarmite D. Bulte, M.P. 
(�iberal), Chair. <www.parl.gc.ca/committee/CommitteePublication.aspx?com
=879&�ang=1&SourceId=8086> [00 Interim Report]. There had been some 
speculation that Ms. Bulte, who was re-elected, might be made Heritage Min-
ister, but this did not happen. The then Minister of Canadian Heritage, Helene 
Scherrer, lost her seat in the election.
8 00 Interim Report, above note 7, at Section F. 
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nologies are used to extend the reach of the classroom beyond its physical 
boundaries, such as in distance education, or to provide access to modern 
instructional media either on campus or away from the classroom.” 
Meanwhile, during the period in which the 1997 legislative reforms 
were put in place and the consultations leading to the 00 Interim Report 
were underway, the important lawsuit involving the legal publishers and 
the Great �ibrary of the �aw Society of upper Canada was ma�ing its way 
through the Canadian courts, beginning in 199 and culminating in the 
release of the Supreme Court of Canada’s decision on March , 00. 
As will be further discussed below, the Supreme Court of Canada in this 
decision appears to have rendered moot a number of the statutory provi-
sions legislated in 1997 and may have introduced important limitations 
on Parliament’s ability to interfere in future with the current balance of 
interests in the Copyright Act. The Court has championed users’ rights as 
exceptions to the rights of copyright holders under the copyright regime. 
That users’ rights aspect of the public interest inherent in copyright, how-
ever, went utterly without recognition in the Heritage Committee 00 
Interim Report. In important areas of its policy recommendations, the 
Committee consistently endorsed the collective administration of copy-
right and recommended licensing as the solution to the tensions between 
copyright owners and users: for educational purposes9 and with respect 
to interlibrary loans.0 
There is also an important case now pending before the Supreme Court 
of Canada in copyright: Robertson v. Thomson Corporation, et al.1 The ma-
jority judgment in the ontario Court of Appeal found that the Globe & 
Mail newspaper prima facie infringed the copyright of freelance contribu-
tor Heather Robertson by including her wor�, not only in the newspaper, 
the Globe & Mail (and archives of it), but in other electronic databases.
It is against this bac�ground, then, that Industry Canada and Heritage 
Canada published their joint Statement and that the recent Bill C-60 has 
been put forward. 
9 00 Interim Report, above note 7, at Recommendations , 5, & 6.
0 Ibid., at Recommendation 7.
1 �eave to appeal granted 1 April 00.      
 Robertson v. Thomson Corporation, [00] 7 o.R. (d) 81 (C.A.) on appeal from 
Robertson v. Thomson Corporation, [1999], 171 D.�.R. (th) 171 (ont. Ct. Gen. 
Div.). �ustice weiler wrote the majority judgment, in which �ustice Gillese con-
curred. �ustice Blair dissented.
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C.	 THE	DIRECTIONS	OF	NEW	REFORM
It is apparent at the outset, in examining the Statement and the subse-
quent Bill C-60, that the 00 Interim Report has given way to a new politi-
cal environment in ottawa. In terms of proposals to be put forward in this 
context, the Statement first declared:
Amendments would permit educational institutions to use networ� 
technologies such as the Internet to deliver classroom instruction and 
material to students remotely, without incurring copyright liability.
And, in particular,
Current educational exceptions permit the performance or display, 
within the classroom, of certain copyright material as part of a lec-
ture. The requirement that the performance or display be confined to 
the classroom would be removed to enable remote students to view 
the lecture using networ� technology, either live or at a more conve-
nient time. Educational institutions would be required to adopt rea-
sonable safeguards to prevent misuse of the copyright material.
And
Material that may be photocopied and provided to students pursu-
ant to an educational institution’s blan�et licence with a collective 
society would also be permitted to be delivered to the students elec-
tronically without additional copyright liability, unless the licence in 
question provides for such delivery. Educational institutions would 
be required to adopt effective safeguards to prevent misuse of the 
copyright material.
Second, in terms of proposals, the Statement identified that
The Act currently permits, as part of an inter-library loan, the re-
production of certain copyright material (notably academic articles), 
provided, among other things, that the requesting patron receives 
only a paper copy.
The Ministers went on to propose an amendment, namely that:
 This appears to parallel option  on technology-Enhanced �earning (Status          
Report option (a)), identified but not adopted by the Committee in the 00 
Interim Report (above note 7).
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The electronic des�top delivery of certain copyright material directly 
to the patron would be permitted, provided that effective safeguards 
were in place to prevent the misuse of the material or of the inter-
library loan service.
on the other hand, it is interesting that the Statement also contained a 
section labeled “Educational use of Publicly Available Internet Material,” 
(as opposed to the section labeled “Educational and Research Access Is-
sues” which we have just been discussing).  with respect to the “Educa-
tional use of Publicly Available Internet material,” the Statement declared 
that the Canadian Government “recognizes that the Internet has become 
an important resource for students and teachers to conduct education-
related activities.” Indeed, the Statement went on to say that “Internet 
material is often downloaded, reproduced or transmitted to students 
and teachers for the purposes of assignments, lessons and research.” The 
Statement prevaricated, however, about whether this is a permitted use: 
“use of Internet material in the classroom setting may trigger copyright 
liability …”[emphasis added]. In the end, however, the Statement declared 
that “this issue” will not be the subject of statutory reform at this time.
The Statement thus raises a number of questions with respect to educa-
tion and interlibrary loans. Are “educational and research access issues” 
so materially different from issues involving the “educational use of pub-
licly available Internet issues” that the first is susceptible to an immedi-
ate statutory solution while the second requires much longer study? Is it 
appropriate to continue to provide exceptions to the rights of copyright 
holders for particular educational institutions, libraries, archives, and 
museums, leaving other such institutions without similar exceptions? Are 
the proposed exceptions to the rights of copyright holders actually neces-
sary given the current state of the law? Is the downloading, reproducing, 
and transmitting of Internet material by students and teachers for the 
purposes of assignments, lessons, and research a permitted use? If partic-
ular statutory exceptions for educational institutions and libraries such 
 This appears to be the first option identified (and rejected in favour of the sec-              
ond) by the Committee in the 00 Interim Report (above note 7): see option 1 
(Status Report option (a)) on Interlibrary �oans. The Committee’s approach 
to interlibrary loans also involved expansion of the collective licensing regime, 
by introducing an extended compulsory licensing regime “where appropriate” 
(Recommendation 7) and otherwise encouraging “the licensing of the electronic 
delivery of copyright protected material directly by rights holders to ensure the 
orderly and efficient electronic delivery of copyright material to library patrons 
for the purpose of research or private study.” (Recommendation 7).
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as those set out by the Statement are to be enacted, should educational 
institutions and libraries be required to put in place or adopt “reasonable” 
or “effective” safeguards? 
D.	 THE	CURRENT	STATE	OF	THE	LAW
1)	 Collective	Administration	of	Copyright
In the copyright area, Canada has been increasingly relying upon an ad-
ministrative regime to supplement and complement traditional copyright 
protection. It is an approach that is quite different from recent initiatives 
to broaden the reach of copyright laws in the united States. Canada’s ap-
proach is distinctive, relying upon recognition of, and legal protection for, 
the collective administration of rights. Canada has probably gone farthest 
in the world in this direction of enlisting administrative law to supple-
ment the policy objectives of copyright. 5 The English language Canadian 
print collective, since its inception in 1988, has made steady inroads into 
the education sector, beginning with its flagship agreement, on August 
1, 1991, with the ontario Ministry of Education, and followed shortly 
thereafter by a similar agreement with the Manitoba Ministry of Educa-
tion (December, 1991). That first, one-year license for reprographic uses of 
literary wor�s in publicly-funded schools in ontario netted the fledgling 
CANCoPy collective (now Access Copyright) $ million.6
A central institution in these developments is the Copyright Board of 
Canada. It describes its own mandate as follows:
The Board is an economic regulatory body empowered to establish, ei-
ther mandatorily or at the request of an interested party, the royalties 
to be paid for the use of copyrighted wor�s, when the administration 
of such copyright is entrusted to a collective-administration society. 
The Board also has the right to supervise agreements between users 
5 Evidence for this is the fact that, on Saturday, october 11, 00, in ottawa, the               
International Association of Copyright Administrative Institutions (IACAI) 
was founded during a meeting at a conference hosted by the Copyright Board of 
Canada — and it was evident during that conference that Canada was a world 
leader in this area.
6 See Margaret Ann wil�inson, “Conflicting values in coping with copyright”          
(199) 9 Canadian �ibrary �ournal 51.
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and licensing bodies and issues licences when the copyright owner 
cannot be located.7
The Supreme Court of Canada, particularly in the recent decision in So-
ciety of Composers, Authors and Music Publishers of Canada v. Canadian As-
sociation of Internet Providers,8 has signaled its acceptance and approval of 
the role being played in Canada by the Copyright Board — and the Board 
itself is ta�ing a leading role in organizing other similar administrative 
bodies worldwide.
The fact that Parliament, in the establishment and empowerment of the 
Board, and the Canadian courts, in endorsing it, appear to be providing 
support and encouragement to rightsholders through the establishment 
of an effective and efficient administrative apparatus is, however, only one 
aspect of these developments. The Board is a quasi-judicial tribunal with 
a clear vision of its responsibility to the public interest — a public interest 
that includes the rights of users as well as copyright holders:
The Board must consider the underlying technologies (such as the In-
ternet, digital radio, satellite communications), the economic issues 
and the interests of owners and users in order to contribute, with fair 
and equitable decisions, to the continued growth of this component 
of Canada’s �nowledge industries…. The �ey objective of the Board is 
to set royalties which are fair and equitable to both copyright owners 
and users of copyright-protected wor�s.9
The Supreme Court of Canada may have been prepared to accept and 
recognize that this administrative Board has an ongoing role with respect 
to protecting user interests under the copyright regime, in the context of 
the administration of the collective rights of rightsholders. But the Court 
has also signaled, in the CCH v. Law Society of Upper Canada decision, that 
there lies inherent within the notion of copyright itself another sphere 
of user rights which are exceptions to the rights of rightsholders — where 
licenses are not required and where uses are free to all at any time. This is 
7 <www.cb-cda.gc.ca/aboutus/mandate-e.html>.
8 Society of Composers, Authors and Music Publishers of Canada v. Canadian Associa-
tion of Internet Providers, 00 SCC 5, [00] S.C.�. No. , [00]  S.C.R. 5 
[Tariff 22 cited to S.C.�.].
9 Copyright Board Canada, Performance Report for the period ending 1 March            
00, <www.tbs-sct.gc.ca/rma/dpr/0-0/CB-CDA/CB-CDA0D-PR_
e.asp?printable=true.> at Section II: Departmental Context — organization, 
Mandate and Strategic outcomes.
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an arena of user rights that the Court will delineate and which lies beyond 
the sphere of influence of the Copyright Board:
The availability of a licence is not relevant to deciding whether a deal-
ing has been fair … fair dealing is an integral part of the scheme of 
copyright law in Canada. Any act falling within the fair dealing ex-
ception will not infringe copyright. If a copyright owner were allowed 
to license people to use its wor� and point to a person’s decision not 
to obtain a licence as proof that his or her dealings were not fair, this 
would extend the scope of the owner’s monopoly over the use of his 
or her wor� in a manner that would not be consistent with the Copy-
right Act’s balance between owner’s rights and user’s interests.0
2)	 The	Position	of	Educational	Institutions,	Libraries,	
Archives,	and	Museums	with	Respect	to	Exceptions	of	
General	Application
a)	 CCH v. Law Society of Upper Canada
This landmar� 00 decision directly involved the exceptions to the copy-
right holders’ rights legislated in the Copyright Act. The decision mar�ed 
the resolution of a long-standing dispute between a group of Canadian le-
gal publishers (CCH Canadian �td., Thomson Canada, including Carswells, 
and Canada �aw Boo�),1 and the governing body for lawyers in the prov-
ince of ontario, the �aw Society of upper Canada. The case concerned the 
operation of the Great �ibrary at osgoode Hall in toronto, home of the 
�aw Society and traditional seat of the province’s courts. The Great Hall 
library has photocopy machines available for the use of patrons and also 
operates a custom photocopy service through which library staff copy and 
deliver (in person, by mail, or by fax) various materials from the collection 
0 CCH v. Law Society of Upper Canada, above note , at para.70.
1 In 199, when this action was commenced, the Canadian legal publishers had            
not joined the English-language print collective in Canada. All the legal publish-
ers involved in the action had become members of AccessCopyright by the time 
the case came before the Supreme Court. AccessCopyright was an intervener be-
fore the Court, as was the French language print collective, CoPIBEC. The other 
interveners in the same interest were the Canadian Publishers’ Council and the 
Association of Canadian Publishers. The other intervener was the Federation of 
�aw Societies of Canada.
 under the direction of �anine Miller, Director of �ibraries for the �aw Society             
of upper Canada.
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which are requested by �aw Society members (lawyers), the judiciary, and 
other researchers. 
The case began in 199. The legal publishers sought a declaration of their 
copyright in a sample of their publications, representative of the various 
types of publications they produced, and an injunction prohibiting the �aw 
Society of upper Canada from continuing the �ibrary’s activities. The �aw 
Society not only filed a defence to the action, but also launched a counter-
claim see�ing a declaration that the �ibrary’s activities fell within the pur-
view of the research element of “fair dealing” under the Copyright Act. 
The judgment of first instance, at the Federal Court trial Division, 
found for the publishers, in part, and dismissed the �aw Society’s counter-
claim. That judgment held for the publishers only in respect of a selection 
of the various materials in which infringement had been alleged — and 
therefore virtually guaranteed appeals from both sides. And, indeed, both 
the publishers and the �aw Society appealed. 
The Federal Court of Appeal then found entirely for the publishers and 
dismissed the �aw Society’s cross-appeal.5 Again, both sides appealed: the 
�aw Society appealing the finding that the Society had infringed the legal 
publishers’ copyrights and the legal publishers cross-appealing the finding 
that the infringement lay only in reproducing their copyrighted wor�s. 
The legal publishers, on the cross-appeal, primarily sought additional re-
lief for infringements of their copyrights by the �aw Society through the 
�aw Society’s faxing of the legal publishers’ copyrighted wor�s to patrons 
and, as the legal publishers viewed the terms of the custom photocopy 
service, through the �aw Society selling the copies.
The judgment of the nine-person, full panel Supreme Court of Canada 
was unanimous and was written by the Chief �ustice. Despite the fact that 
the Court accepted the legal publishers’ contention that they held copy-
right interests in all the wor�s involved in the case, the �aw Society pre-
vailed entirely in the result. 
As mentioned, this litigation was based upon facts presented in 199, 
before the exceptions for “libraries, archives and museums” or “educa-
tional institutions” had been legislated and the Supreme Court held the 
later exceptions were not available to the �aw Society of upper Canada in 
 Copyright Act, above note , s. 9.
 CCH et al. v. Law Society of Upper Canada, [00]  F.C. 51, 169 F.t.R. 1, 179 
D.�.R. (th) 609,  C.P.R. (th) 19, 7 C.P.R. (d) 19, 199 F.C.�. No. 167 .
5 CCH v. Law Society of Upper Canada, [00]  F.C. 1, 1 D.�.R. (th) 85, 89 
N.R. 1, 18 C.P.R. (th) 161, [00] F.C.�. No. 690, 00 FCA 187.
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defending its �ibrary’s activities. However, the Supreme Court held that 
those exceptions were not necessary to give the �aw Society a full defence 
for its activities: the traditional exception of fair dealing gave the Great 
�ibrary protection from copyright claims in respect of its activities.
The �ey feature of the Chief �ustice’s reasons, for our purposes, is the 
unequivocal assertion of users’ rights in copyright as balancing the copy-
right holder’s rights:6 “Canada’s Copyright Act sets out the rights and obli-
gations of both copyright owners and users.”7 And again, the Chief �ustice 
referred to the “exceptions to copyright infringement, perhaps more prop-
erly understood as users’ rights, … set out in ss. 9 and 0 of the Act.”8 
Specifically, the Chief �ustice wrote:
Procedurally, a defendant is required to prove [to come within the fair 
dealing exception under the Copyright Act] that his or her dealing with 
a wor� has been fair; however, the fair dealing exception is perhaps 
more properly understood as an integral part of the Copyright Act than 
simply a defence. Any act falling within the fair dealing exception will 
not be an infringement of copyright. The fair dealing exception, li�e 
other exceptions in the Copyright Act, is a user’s right. In order to main-
tain the proper balance between the rights of a copyright owner and 
users’ interests, it must not be interpreted restrictively.9
Another important aspect of the judgment which increases the extent 
of the user exceptions in copyright is the first clear statement that agency 
is permitted within the scope of the fair dealing exceptions. The Court 
6 Indeed, the Supreme Court of Canada began to champion user rights in the             
copyright environment even before the decision in CCH v. Law Society of Upper 
Canada when �ustice Binnie wrote his judgment in Théberge v. Galerie d’Art 
du Petit Champlain Inc. 00 SCC , <www.lexum.umontreal.ca/csc-scc/en/
pub/00/vol/html/00scr_06.html>, [00]  S.C.R. 6, at paras. 1 &  
respectively: [Théberge cited to �exuM].
The proper balance … lies not only in recognizing the creator’s rights but in 
giving due weight to their limited nature. In crassly economic terms it would 
be as inefficient to overcompensate artists … as it would be self-defeating to 
under-compensate them …. 
 Excessive control by holders of copyrights and other forms of intellectual 
property may unduly limit the ability of the public domain to incorporate 
and embellish creative innovation in the long-term interests of society as a 
whole, or create practical obstacles to proper utilization. 
7 CCH v. Law Society of Upper Canada, above note , at para. 11.
8 Ibid., at para. 1.
9 Ibid., at para. 8.
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held that the �aw Society was entitled to rely upon its general practice to 
establish fair dealing, rather than having to adduce evidence that every 
patron used the material provided for in a fair dealing manner:50
The language [of section 9] is general. “Dealing” connotes not indi-
vidual acts, but a practice or system. This comports with the purpose 
of the fair dealing exception, which is to ensure that users are not 
unduly restricted in their ability to use and disseminate copyrighted 
wor�s. Persons or institutions relying on the s. 9 fair dealing ex-
ception need only provide that their own dealings with copyrighted 
wor�s were for the purpose of research or private study and were fair. 
They may do this either by showing that their own practices and poli-
cies were research-based and fair, or by showing that all individual 
dealings with the materials were in fact research-based and fair.51
when the Great �ibrary staff ma�e copies of the requested cases, 
statutes, excerpts from legal texts and legal commentary, they do so 
for the purpose of research. Although the retrieval and photocopying 
of legal wor�s are not research in and of themselves, they are neces-
sary conditions of research and thus part of the research process.5
The set of “fair dealing” exceptions in the Copyright Act provides:
Fair dealing for the purpose of research or private study does not in-
fringe copyright.5
Fair dealing for the purpose of criticism or review does not infringe 
copyright if the following are mentioned:
(a) the source; and
(b) if given in the source, the name of the
(i) author, in the case of a wor�,
(ii) performer, in the case of a performer’s performance,
(iii) ma�er, in the case of a sound recording, or
(iv) broadcaster, in the case of a communication signal.5
Fair dealing for the purpose of news reporting does not infringe 
copyright if the following are mentioned
(a) the source; and
50 Ibid., at para. 6.
51 Ibid., at para. 6.
5 Ibid., at para. 6.
5 Copyright Act, above note , s. 9.
5 Ibid., s. 9.1.
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(b) if given in the source, the name of the
(i) author, in the case of a wor�,
(ii) performer, in the case of a performer’s performance,
(iii) ma�er, in the case of a sound recording, or
(iv) broadcaster, in the case of a communication signal.55
The Supreme Court stated, in this context, that “[i]t may be possible to 
deal fairly with the whole wor� … for the purpose of research or private 
study, it may be essential to copy an entire academic article or an entire 
judicial decision.”56
Further, the Court found that when staff of the Great �ibrary, as part 
of their custom photocopy service, faxed wor�s to patrons, “the fax trans-
missions were not communications to the public.”57 The Supreme Court 
approved the reasoning of the trial judge that fax transmissions were 
not telecommunications within the rights of the copyright holder under 
section (1)(f) because they “emanated from a single point and were each 
intended to be received at a single point.”58 on the other hand, the Su-
preme Court appeared to agree with the Court of Appeal that, if a series 
of faxes were sent between the same two points, that “might constitute 
an infringement of an owner’s right to communicate to the public.”59 The 
Supreme Court also observed, in considering the criteria for the fair deal-
ing exception, that “the patrons of the custom photocopying service can-
not reasonably be expected to always conduct their research on-site at the 
Great �ibrary. twenty percent of the requestors live outside the toronto 
area; it would be burdensome to expect them to travel to the city each 
time they wanted to trac� down a specific source..”60
It would appear, then, that, at the very least, the Supreme Court of Can-
ada’s view of the scope of the traditional exemptions from the rights of 
copyright holders under the Copyright Act has brought educational insti-
tutions, libraries, archives, and museums that are not included within the 
statutory schemes for special exemptions (basically, those operating in a 
for-profit context), some measure of parity with their sister institutions 
who have been legislated into those special exemptions. For example, the 
55 Ibid., s. 9..
56 CCH v. Law Society of Upper Canada, above note , at para. 56.
57 Ibid., at para. 7.
58 Ibid., at para. 77, quoting the trial judgment (above note ) at para. 167.
59 CCH v. Law Society of Upper Canada, above note , at para. 77.
60 Ibid., at para. 69.
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Supreme Court clearly stated that within the exception for fair dealing, 
“research is not limited to non-commercial or private contexts.”61
b)	 “Tariff 22”	Decision
Since the Supreme Court’s decision in CCH v. Law Society of Upper Canada, 
�ustice Binnie, on behalf of the Supreme Court, �ustice �eBel concurring, 
has continued the focus on defences to infringement in the subsequent 
“Tariff 22” case involving retransmission rights: 
[the exception claimed] is not a loophole but an important element 
of the balance struc� by the statutory copyright scheme. It finds its 
roots, perhaps, in the defence of innocent dissemination sometimes 
available to boo�stores, libraries, news vendors, and the li�e who, 
generally spea�ing, have no actual �nowledge of an alleged libel, are 
aware of no circumstances to put them on notice to suspect a libel, 
and committed no negligence in failing to find out about the libel.6
The Court expressly found that the exception to the rights of the copy-
right holder at bar6 was not “an exemption from liability [which] should 
be read narrowly …. under the Copyright Act, the rights of the copyright 
owner and the limitations on those rights should be read together to give 
“the fair and balanced reading that befits remedial legislation.’”6
Specifically, the “Tariff 22 decision” arose from ongoing proceedings be-
fore the Copyright Board of Canada. SoCAN had applied to the Board for 
approval of a tariff (“tariff ”) to be applied to Internet Service Providers 
[ISPs] located in Canada. SoCAN too� the position that, in the absence of 
such a royalty arrangement with SoCAN, which administers both Cana-
dian and foreign-owned copyrights in music,65 the ISPs were violating the 
music copyright holders’ rights “to communicate the wor� to the public by 
telecommunication”66 and, either simultaneously or alternatively, were vio-
lating the music copyright holders’ rights to “authorize any such acts.”67 The 
61 Ibid., at para. 51. The Court, in the same context and paragraph, stated that 
“‘Research’ must be given a large and liberal interpretation in order to ensure 
that users’ rights are not unduly constrained.”
6 Tariff 22, above note 8, at para. 89, authorities omitted.
6 Copyright Act, above note , s. .(1)(b).
6 Tariff 22, above note 8 at para. 88, quoting the unanimous decision of the Court 
itself in CCH, per Mc�achlin, C.�., above note , at para. 8.
65 The foreign copyrightholders are represented by SoCAN through reciprocal ar-         
rangements with counterpart collecting societies in other countries.
66 A partial quotation from the     Copyright Act, above note , s. (1)(f).
67 The concluding words of the     Copyright Act, ibid., s. (1).
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ISPs, on the other hand, too� the position that they could not be subject 
to any such tariff because their activities were excepted from the rights of 
copyright holders, in wor�s in music as in any other wor�, by the wording of 
section .(1)(b) of the Copyright Act.68 
In response to this challenge, the Board too� the unusual step, which 
has been subsequently endorsed by the appellate courts, of splitting its 
proceedings into two parts, “Phase I” being a hearing to determine the 
question of liability, after which the Board issued the reasons which form 
the subject matter of this case.69 The Board issued its decision on Phase I 
at the end of october 1999. SoCAN applied to the Federal Court of Appeal 
for judicial review.70 The respondents were various associations involved 
in the transmission of music, as well as individual broadcasters and tele-
phone companies.71 Eventually, the Federal Court of Appeal decided that 
the ISPs did indeed fall within the exemption for common carriers and 
were not able to be subject to the tariff, except, in the majority’s opinion,7 
in the instance where an ISP cached material on its own site. A number 
68 Ibid., s. .(1): 
 For the purposes of communication to the public by telecommunication, 
(b) a person whose only act in respect of the communication of a wor� or 
other subject matter to the public consists of providing the means of 
telecommunication necessary for another person to so communicate the 
wor� or other subject-matter does not communicate that wor� or other 
subject-matter to the public. 
69 As �ustice Evans of the Federal Court of Appeal, writing for himself and �ustice              
�inden, explained, “only those whose activities were found at the end of Phase I 
to infringe copyright would need to participate at Phase II, when the Board would 
determine which of them should be required to pay a royalty, on what basis the 
royalty should be calculated, and at what rate it should be set.” Society of Com-
posers, Authors and Music Publishers of Canada v. Canadian Association of Internet 
Providers, et al., 00 FCA 166, [00]  F.C. , 15 D.�.R. (th) 118, 90 N.R. 11, 19 
C.P.R. (th) 89, [00] F.C.�. No. 691 at para. .
70 SoCAN’s position was supported by the intervener Canadian Recording Indus-         
try Association and Neighbouring Rights Collective of Canada.
71 The respondents were: the    Canadian Association of Internet Providers, Canadian 
Cable Television Association, At&t Canada �ong Distance Services Company, MCI 
Communications Corporation, Bell/ExpressVu, Canadian Association of Broad-
casters, Telus Communications Inc., Bell Canada, the Canadian Broadcasting Cor-
poration, the Canadian Motion Picture Distributors Association, the Canadian 
Recording Industry Association, timewarner Inc, Aliant Inc., MTS Communica-
tions Inc., and Sas�atchewan telecommunications [emphasis indicates those who 
were also appellants to the Supreme Court of Canada].
7 �ustice Sharlow dissented from the majority just on this one point, agreeing            
with the Board that those who cache also fall within the exception. See Tariff 22, 
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of the respondents before the Federal Court of Appeal appealed to the 
Supreme Court,7 and were joined by interested interveners.7 SoCAN re-
sponded.75
The Supreme Court found that the exemption in section .(1)(b) for 
common carriers, from the copyright holders rights to control telecommu-
nication in section (1)(f), was meant to distinguish between those who use 
telecommunications to supply or obtain content (who would not be eligible 
for the exemption from the rights of the copyright holder)76 and those who 
facilitate electronic communications as intermediaries, who only provide 
“the means of communication necessary,”77 who do benefit from the exemp-
tion. 78 The Court also found that the copyright holders’ right to control 
authorization of acts connected to the rights of the rightsholders listed in 
section  of the Act79 was not infringed by the activities of ISPs. The Court 
held that �nowledge of the possibility that the means of communication 
they controlled could be used for infringing purposes was not, in the ab-
sence of actual �nowledge of infringing activity, enough to construe the in-
termediary ISPs as having authorized the infringing activity: 
above note 8, at para. 9 and also �ustice Sharlow himself in the Federal Court 
of Appeal decision, above note 70, at para. 195–97.
7 Although not all — only those listed in bold in note 71, above.            
7 The Internet Commerce Coalition, the European telecommunications Networ�        
operators’ Association, the European Internet Service Provider’s Association, 
the Australian Internet Industry Association, the telecom Services Association, 
and the uS Internet Industry Association.
75 �oined by the Canadian Recording Industry Association (appearing here as an           
intervener rather than, as before the Federal Court of Appeal, as a respondent) 
and the International Federation of Phonogram Industry.
76 Tariff 22, above note 8, at para. 10.
77 Copyright Act, above note , s. .(1)(b) uses the phrase “the means of telecom-
munication necessary.” 
78 The Court agreed both with the Board and with �ustice Sharlow, in the mi-             
nority in the Federal Court of Appeal, and included those ISPs who cache as 
among those benefiting from the exemption because “necessary” includes those 
measures “reasonably useful and proper to achieve the benefits of enhanced 
economy and efficiency.” (quoting from Tariff 22, per Binnie, �., at para. 9). The 
full discussion of the Court’s reasoning specifically with respect to caching is at 
paras. 11–19. See above note 8.
79 The exemption from the rights of copyright holders stated in the           Copyright Act, 
above note , s. .(1)(b) does not include exemption from the right to control 
authorization set out in s. (1). Thus the ISPs could have been found to be violat-
ing the authorization rights even though s. .(1)(b) was found to give the ISPs 
a defence against the claim that they were infringing the telecommunication 
rights of the rightsholders.
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… when massive amounts of non-copyrighted material are accessible 
to the end user, it is not possible to impute to the Internet Service 
Provider, based solely on the provision of Internet facilities, an au-
thority to download copyrighted material as opposed to non-copy-
righted material.80
In coming to this conclusion, the Court was cognizant of the impossibil-
ity of monitoring the vast content involved in Internet transmission but 
did concede “that ‘authorization’ could be inferred in a proper case but all 
would depend upon the facts.”81 
3)	 Current	Statutory	Provisions	for	Educational	
Exceptions	
The recent Statement claims that the exceptions set out in the Copyright 
Act currently “permit the performance or display, within the classroom, of 
certain copyright material as part of a lecture.” 
It is certainly the case that section 9.(1) of the Act provides
(1) It is not an infringement of copyright for an educational institu-
tion or a person acting under its authority
(a) to ma�e a manual reproduction of a wor� onto a dry-erase 
board, flip chart or other similar surface intended for 
displaying handwritten material, or
(b) to ma�e a copy of a wor� to be used to project an image of 
that copy using an overhead projector or similar device
 for the purposes of education or training on the premises of an 
educational institution [emphasis added].
However, in addition to the requirement on which the Government 
Statement focuses, that these activities ta�e place “on the premises of an 
educational institution,” there are three important caveats to this excep-
tion. First, it will be recalled that “educational institution” is a defined 
term in the Act and therefore there are institutions involved in education 
in Canada which cannot qualify for these exemptions because they fall 
80 Tariff 22, above note 9, at para.1.
81 Ibid., at para. 18. As a result of the appeal, the Supreme Court of Canada remit-            
ted the matter bac� to the Board, ordering it to proceed to Phase II of its hear-
ing in accordance with the reasons of the Court. Because of the decision of the 
Supreme Court, however, a very narrow scope for Phase II remained before the 
Copyright Board. 
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outside the Act’s definition. Second, the statute states that “the exemp-
tion from copyright infringement provided by paragraph (1) (b) … does 
not apply [except in the case of manual reproduction] if the wor� or other 
subject-matter is commercially available in a medium that is appropriate 
for the purpose referred to in that paragraph ….”8
Third, the exemption is not available if the “action referred to” is “car-
ried out with motive of gain.”8
In any event, the Statement also says the current exemptions “permit 
the performance …, within the classroom, of certain copyright material as 
part of a lecture.” [emphasis added].
Certainly section 9.5 of the Act currently provides
It is not an infringement of copyright for an educational institution 
[again, as defined in the Act] or a person acting under its authority to 
do the following acts …
a. the live performance in public, primarily by students of the edu-
cational institution, of a wor�; [and]
b. the performance in public of a sound recording or of a wor� or per-
formers’ performance that is embodied in a sound recording; and
c. the performance in public of a wor� or other subject-matter at the 
time of its communication to the public by telecommunication
However, the same section also contains limitations on the exercise of 
this exception:8 the activities are only exempted if
– they are done on the premises [[emphasis added] of an education-
al institution for educational or training purposes and 
– [they are done] not for profit, [and]
– [they are done] before an audience consisting primarily of 
• students of the educational institution, [or]
8 Copyright Act, above note , s. 9.().
8 Copyright Act, above note , s. 9.(1). Note that s. 9.() provides that “[a]n edu-
cational institution … does not have motive of gain where it or the person acting 
under its authority, does anything referred to in s. 9. … and recovers no more 
than the costs, including overhead costs, associated with doing that act.”
8 As well as two of the limitations mentioned above in connection with the excep-             
tion in s. 9.: again, this exception in s. 9.5 is limited to statutorily defined 
“educational institutions” and the exception does not apply where the institution 
is engaged in the activities for “motive of gain,” although, again, the exception 
would apply if the institution is simply engaged in cost recovery (s.9.).
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• instructors acting under the authority of the educational 
institution or
• any person who is directly responsible for setting a curricu-
lum for the educational institution85
Moreover, if the communication to the public by telecommunication is be-
ing received by the educational institution by unlawful means, then its 
performance in public by the educational institution is not excepted from 
copyright infringement.86
while section 9.5(c) permits performance of contemporaneous or syn-
chronous telecommunicated wor�s and subject matter, certain further 
asynchronous performances in educational institutions are also permit-
ted — but only of news and news commentary: 
Subject to subsection ()87 and section 9.9,88 it is not an infringement 
of copyright for an educational institution or a person acting under 
its authority to
(a) ma�e, at the time of its communication to the public by tele-
communication, a single copy of a news program or a news com-
mentary program, excluding documentaries, for the purposes of 
performing the copy for the students of the educational institu-
tion for educational and training purposes; and
(b) perform the copy in public, at any time or times within one year 
after the ma�ing of a copy under paragraph (a), before an audi-
ence consisting primarily of students of the educational institu-
85 These provisions of s. 9.5 have been laid out for ease of reference here and do                
not have the same format in the statute, although the wording is identical.
86 Copyright Act, above note , s. 9.8. This limitation on the exception also applies 
to the exceptions for news and news summary programs and other broadcasts 
which are about to be discussed.
87 This is a limited term exception. Section 9.6() of the          Copyright Act, above note 
, goes on to provide:
The educational institution must
– on the expiration of one year after ma�ing a copy under paragraph (1)(a), 
[either] pay the royalties and comply with any terms and conditions fixed 
under this Act for the ma�ing of the copy or destroy the copy; and
– where it has paid the royalties referred to in paragraph (a), pay the royal-
ties and comply with any terms and conditions fixed under this Act for 
any performance in public of the copy after the expiration of that year.
88 Section 9.9 of the    Copyright Act, above note , details record-�eeping require-
ments with which the educational institution must comply if it ma�es a copy of 
a news program or news commentary program and performs it.
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tion on its premises for educational or training purposes [empha-
sis added].89
Another exception provides that broadcasts of other subject matter may 
also be performed, but this area of exception is available only once appro-
priate royalties have been paid:
It is not an infringement of copyright for the educational institution 
or a person acting under its authority to perform the copy [of a broad-
cast other than news or news commentary90] in public for educational 
training purposes on the premises of the educational institution before 
an audience consisting primarily of students of the educational insti-
tution if the educational institution pays the royalties and complies 
with any terms and conditions fixed under this Act for the perform-
ance in public [emphasis added].91
4)	 Current	Provisions	for	“Libraries,	Archives,	and	
Museums”
The Statement alludes to a provision of the Copyright Act that “currently 
permits, as part of an inter-library loan, the reproduction of certain copy-
right material (notably academic articles), provided, among other things, 
that the requesting patron receives only a paper copy.”  This is a reference 
to section 0.(5) of the Act which provides:
A [�AM] or a person acting under the authority of a [�AM] may do, on 
behalf of a person who is a patron of another [�AM], anything under 
subsection (1) or () in relation to printed matter that it is authorized 
by this section to do on behalf of a person who is one of its patrons, 
89 Copyright Act, above note , s. 9.6.
90 Section 9.7 (1) of the     Copyright Act, above note , provides
… it is not an infringement of copyright for an educational institution or a 
person acting under its authority to ma�e a single copy of a wor� or other 
subject-matter at the time that it is communicated to the public by telecom-
munication; and �eep the copy for up to thirty days to decide whether to 
perform the copy for educational and training purposes.
 Section 9.7() provides that unless either the copy is destroyed after thirty 
days, or royalties are paid, the institution is infringing — and, again, s. 9.8 
applies, ma�ing the exception invalid if the communication was originally 
received by unlawful means.
91 Copyright Act, above note , s. 9.7().
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but the copy given to the patron must not be in digital form [emphasis 
added].9
And the exceptions referred to are as follows:
0.(1) It is not an infringement of copyright for a [�AM] or a person 
acting under its authority to do anything on behalf of any person 
that the person may do personally under section 9 [fair dealing for 
the purposes of research or private study] or 9.1 [fair dealing for 
criticism].
() It is not an infringement of copyright for a [�AM] or a person act-
ing under the authority of a [�AM] to ma�e, by reprographic repro-
duction, for any person requesting to use the copy for research or 
private study, a copy of the wor� that is, or that is contained in, an 
article published in
(a) a scholarly, scientific or technical periodical; or
(b) a newspaper or periodical, other than a scholarly, scien-
tific or technical periodical, if the newspaper or periodical was pub-
lished more than one year before the copy is made.
Section 0. goes on to provide further restrictions on the exceptions 
from the rights of the copyright holders provided in subsection (). one 
applies to the whole of subsection ():
A [�AM] may ma�e a copy under subsection () only on the condition 
that
(a) the person for whom the copy will be made has satisfied the 
[�AM] that the person will not use the copy for a purpose other 
than research and private study; and
(b) the person is provided with a single copy of the wor�.
Another applies only to the copying of newspapers and periodicals:
Paragraph ()(b) does not apply in respect of a wor� of fiction or po-
etry or a dramatic or musical wor�.9
9 The statute goes further and instructs the �AMs that “where an intermediate            
copy is made in order to copy a wor� referred to in subsection (5), once the copy 
is given to the patron, the intermediate copy must be destroyed. (Copyright Act, 
above note , s. 0. (5.1)).
9 Copyright Act, above note , s. 0.().
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And finally, the 1997 amendments added the further caveat on these 
exceptions for �AMs that
The Governor in Council may, for the purposes of this section, ma�e 
regulations
(a) defining “newspaper” and “periodical”;
(b) defining scholarly, scientific and technical periodicals;
(c) prescribing the information to be recorded about any action ta�-
en under subsection (1) or (5) and the manner and form in which 
the information is to be �ept; and
(d) prescribing the manner and form in which the conditions set out 
in subsection () are to be met.
And, indeed, the Government did produce regulations, which, inter alia, 
defined “newspaper or periodical” as “a newspaper or periodical, other 
than a scholarly, scientific or technical periodical, that was published 
more than one year before the copy is made.”9
All of this foregoing legislating for �AMs, however, would appear to have 
been rendered redundant because of the Supreme Court’s clarification of 
the “fair dealing” exception to the rights of the copyright holders of general 
application. The Court stated clearly that “a library can always attempt to 
prove that its dealings with a copyrighted wor� are fair under section 9 
of the Copyright Act. It is only if a library were unable to ma�e out the fair 
dealing exception under section 9 that it would need to turn to the Copy-
right Act to prove that it qualified for the library exemption.”95 Moreover, the 
Court said that “research, private study, criticism, review or news reporting 
… these allowable purposes should not be given a restrictive interpretation 
or this could result in the undue restriction of users’ rights.”96
9 Exception for Educational Institutions, Libraries, Archives and Museums Regulations, 
SoR/99-5, <http://laws.justice.gc.ca/en/C-/SoR-99-5/>, s. .
95 CCH v. Law Society of Upper Canada, above note , at para. 9.
96 Ibid., at para. 5.
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E.	 ARE	THE	PROPOSED	AMENDMENTS	FOR	EDUCATION	
AND	INTERLIBRARY	LOANS	NECESSARY	AND	
APPROPRIATE?
1)	 The	Question	of	Reasonable	and	Effective	Safeguards
one question raised by the proposals in the Statement, now expressed 
in Bill C-60, is whether educational institutions and libraries should be 
required to put in place or adopt “reasonable” or “effective” safeguards as 
a condition of benefiting from statutory exceptions.
one of the elements provided for in the regulations made under the 
existing �AMs exceptions to the Copyright Act97 is the following precisely 
worded and laid out notice to be placed at photocopiers:
wARNING!
wor�s protected by copyright may be copied on this photocopier only 
if authorized by
(a) the Copyright Act for the purpose of fair dealing or under specific 
exemptions set out in that Act;
(b) the copyright owner; or
(c) a license agreement between this institution and a collective so-
ciety or a tariff, if any.
For details of authorized copying, please consult the license agree-
ment of applicable tariff, if any, and other relevant information avail-
able from a staff member.
The Copyright Act provides for civil and criminal remedies for in-
fringement of copyright.
The Great �ibrary of the �aw Society of upper Canada had traditionally 
posted its own notice:
The copyright law of Canada governs the ma�ing of photocopies or 
other reproductions of copyright material. Certain copying may be 
an infringement of the copyright law. This library is not responsible 
for infringing copies made by the users of these machines.98
97 This notice is specifically worded and laid out in s. 8 of the             Exception for Educa-
tional Institutions, Libraries, Archives and Museums Regulations, SoR/99-5.
98 CCH v. Law Society of Upper Canada, above note , at para. 9.
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Despite argument over the effect of the notice, the Supreme Court 
found that this notice was sufficient to overcome any argument that the 
Great �ibrary implicitly sanctioned, approved or countenanced copyright 
infringement.99
one wonders, then, why there would ever be any need to post the more 
elaborate signs provided for in the regulations made under the �AMs ex-
ceptions to the Copyright Act.100 
Certainly, the Supreme Court of Canada has specifically approved the 
simpler policy notices in use by the Great �ibrary of the �aw Society of up-
per Canada since 1996.101
Moreover, in finding ISPs not liable for infringing the copyright inter-
est of authorizing activities of their end users in the “tariff ” case, the 
Supreme Court has signalled that having �nowledge of the possibility that 
end users may infringe copyright will not, absent specific �nowledge of 
end users’ infringing activity, place the intermediary in the position of 
authorizing any infringing activity of end users. The Court was concerned 
with the impossibility of monitoring the activities of end users — a situ-
ation at least as difficult in the library or educational institution environ-
ment, given the relative paucity of resources for monitoring the behaviour 
of students and patrons that these organizations have (in contrast to the 
technology at the disposal of commercial ISPs, for example).
These factors lead to the conclusion that Government attempts to re-
quire �AMs to put in place “effective safeguards … to prevent the misuse 
of the material or of the inter-library loan service,” beyond the type of 
notice used by the Great �ibrary and approved by the Supreme Court of 
Canada, are unnecessary, impractical, and probably unenforceable.
The Statement also anticipated obligations being placed on education-
al institutions to “adopt reasonable safeguards to prevent misuse of the 
copyright material” and, indeed, in telecommunicating a lesson, Bill C-60 
provides that the institution must ta�e any measure prescribed by regula-
tion10 and “must ta�e measures that can reasonably be expected to limit 
the communication by telecommunication of the lesson to [students and 
instructors] and prevent any use of it by them after the course of which the 
 99 CCH v. Law Society of Upper Canada, above note , at para. .
100 Set out above and specifically worded and laid out in s. 8 of the              Exception for Edu-
cational Institutions, Libraries, Archives and Museums Regulations, SoR/99-5.
101 The contents of these longer and larger notices are set out at            CCH v. Law Society 
of Upper Canada, above note , at para. 61.
10 Bill C-60, s. 18, proposing s. 0.01()(c).      
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lesson forms a part has ended as well as any reproduction or communica-
tion of it by them.”10 while it may be a reasonable further safeguard pro-
posed in Bill C-60 that an educational institution “must not communicate 
the lesson by telecommunication … after the course of which the lesson 
forms a part has ended,”10 it appears to show a complete lac� of under-
standing of the process of course development from year to year to insist 
that the institution, professor, or teacher “must destroy any fixation of the 
lesson within 0 days after the course of which it form a part has ended.”105 
And, again, given the approach ta�en by the Supreme Court, these provi-
sions are at best impractical and unnecessary, and at worst unenforceable.
2)	 The	Question	of	Interlibrary	Loans
Bill C-60 confirms the 1997 provisions creating exemption for certain �AM 
activities in the nature of fair dealing106 but adds107 that they
… do not apply with respect to the ma�ing of a copy in digital form of 
printed matter… [for I�� between �AMs] unless the [�AM] providing 
the copy ta�es measures that can reasonably be expected to prevent 
the ma�ing of any reproduction of the copy other than a single print-
ing, its communication, or its use for a period of more than seven 
days.108
10 Bill C-60, s. 18, proposing s. 0.01()(d). The Bill also imposes an apparently             
arduous archiving responsibility upon institutions: that records of any lessons 
taped, recorded, or otherwise “fixed” must be �ept for three years (Bill C-60, s. 
18, proposing s. 0.01()(e)). Given the rapid turnover of technological systems 
in educational institutions, the decentralization of responsibilities for lesson 
preparation, and scarce resources for technological support of teaching, one 
wonders whether such an onerous record-�eeping obligation is reasonable. 
10 Bill C-60, s. 18, proposing s. 0.01()(a).      
105 Bill C-60, s. 18, proposing s. 0.01()(b).      
106 See the discussion above in the section on Current Provisions for “�ibraries,            
Archives and Museums.”
107 The 00 Committee’s approach to interlibrary loans involved expansion of the           
collective licensing regime (typical of the Committee’s whole approach), by in-
troducing an extended compulsory licensing regime “where appropriate” (00 
Interim Report, above note 7, at Recommendation 7) and otherwise encouraging 
“the licensing of the electronic delivery of copyright protected material directly 
by rights holders to ensure the orderly and efficient electronic delivery of copy-
right material to library patrons for the purpose of research or private study.” 
(Recommendation 7.)
108 Bill C-60, above note , s. 19, proposing to replace the current s. 0.(5) of the                
Copyright Act, above note , with a new subsection. 
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As drafted, Bill C-60’s section 0.(5) appears to have “thrown the baby 
out with the bathwater” in that the exception for interlibrary loan copies 
provided to the patron in other than in electronic form (for example, by 
fax) seems to have been lost. Moreover, it is difficult to discern which �AM 
would be considered the �AM “providing the copy” and therefore having 
the obligations about reasonable measures: does the Bill intend the in-
stitution supplying the information to the requesting institution to bear 
that responsibility for reasonable measures? or is it the receiving institu-
tion whose patron made the request that is to bear that responsibility? 
The current drafting of the Bill is not clear.109 Moreover, the notion that a 
�AM can prevent a patron from ma�ing use of a document “for a period 
of more than seven days” seems particularly ill-conceived and should be 
removed from the Bill. Copyright holders have not traditionally had the 
right to prevent particular uses of wor�s, only to control certain actions 
ta�en with respect to wor�s; such as copying, publishing, and so on. As the 
Supreme Court of Canada has so recently pointed out (discussed above), 
it is users who are guaranteed certain uses of wor�s under the Copyright 
Act. �imiting patrons to seven days use seems contrary to the spirit of the 
Copyright Act. In addition, of course, it would seem virtually impossible to 
police. Finally, the proposed provision does not permit interlibrary loan of 
materials held by the originating library in electronic form.
whatever the merits of its drafting, the proposed exception seems re-
dundant in light of the reasoning of the Supreme Court of Canada in the 
CCH v. Law Society of Upper Canada case. That case specifically addresses 
the question of the delivery of materials to patrons using the telecommu-
nication process of the fax. The issue of delivery of materials to patrons 
using the digital networ� process of the Internet would seem to call forth 
exactly the same reasoning. As in the case of fax delivery, Internet deliv-
ery of interlibrary loan materials would be “emanating from a single point 
and each intended to be received at a single point.”110 The librarian engaged 
in the delivery of the electronic version to the patron would be relying 
upon the patron’s right to private study and research, just as in the case at 
bar in CCH v. Law Society of Upper Canada, whatever the special provisions 
added since 1997 for certain libraries might provide. Thus it would seem 
109 whichever institution is to bear the responsibility for reasonable measures, the           
Bill will need amendment to clarify what is meant by being expected to prevent 
“its communication.” 
110 CCH v. Law Society of Upper Canada, above note  at para. 77, quoted earlier as 
well.
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that the amendments proposed in Bill C-60 dealing with interlibrary loans 
are very probably unnecessary.
3)	 The	Question	of	Performance	or	Display	of	Lectures	to	
Remote	Sites	
Following the direction indicated by the Statement, Bill C-60 creates a 
regime under which educational institutions are to be exempted from 
copyright liability when engaged in distance learning activities using tele-
communication.111 This is particularly important given that Bill C-60 pro-
poses to ma�e it absolutely clear that 
a person who ma�es a wor� or other subject-matter available to the 
public in a way that allows members of the public to access it through 
telecommunication from a place and at a time individually chosen by 
them communicates it to the public by telecommunication.11
The proposed scheme for educational institutions centres around the 
concept of the “lesson,” a new term in the Copyright Act, which is not de-
fined in the Bill, other than in tautological terms.11 Inherent in the defini-
111 Bill C-60, above note , s. 18 (adding a new s. 0.01 after the existing s. 0 in the                   
Copyright Act, above note ).
11 Bill C-60, above note , s. , proposing to replace the existing s. .(1)(a) of the                
Copyright Act (above note ) with the s. .(1)(a) quoted here. It had appeared 
that the exception to “enable remote students to view the lecture using networ� 
technology, either live or at a more convenient time,” posited by the Statement 
(above note ) might have been intended to be an addition to s. 9.5, through 
which Parliament has created an exception to the copyright holder’s right of 
reproduction (Copyright Act, above note , s. (1)(a )). That exception, by virtue 
of this amendment, would necessarily be an exception to the rightsholder’s 
right to communicate the wor� to the public by telecommunication (Copyright 
Act, above note , s. (1)(f)).
11 Bill C-60, above note , s. 18 would create a new s. 0.01(1) in the               Copyright Act 
(above note ) providing, in part, “In this section, ‘lesson’ means any lesson, 
test or examination….” Although the definition refers to lessons “on the prem-
ises,” the section in which the definition is to be operative, s. 0.01, revolves 
around “communication to the public by telecommunication.” It seems odd that 
this concept of “lesson” is not carried forward into the offline teaching environ-
ment through amendment to the older s. 9 amendments discussed above. It 
is interesting that Bill C-60 carries forward the signal in the Statement (above 
note ) that these new amendments, which permit an educational institution 
to enlarge the classroom by creating a virtual classroom through employing 
networ� technology and to create asynchronous delivery of a lecture, apply only 
so long as networ� technology is used. The Statement spo�e of the proposed 
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tion of “lesson” is the concept that in it “a wor� or other subject-matter is 
copied, reproduced, translated, performed in public or otherwise used on 
the premises of an educational institution or communicated by telecom-
munication to the public situated on those premises.”11 Thus a distance 
class is to emanate from the educational institution, not from the home 
office of a teacher or professor, apparently. But, even more confusingly, 
despite this definition of “lesson,” it will be an infringement of copyright 
to communicate a lesson by telecommunication (or fix such a lesson or 
otherwise perform any act in connection with such a lesson)115 if the “les-
son” includes “a wor� or other subject-matter whose use in the lesson con-
stitute an infringement of copyright or for whose use in the lesson the 
consent of the copyright owner is required.”116 So, is Bill C-60 creating any 
exception for educational institutions in this regard at all by introducing 
the proposed section 0.01?
Moreover, rather than generously extending protection from liability 
to students, Bill C-60 seems to actually target students, in that a student 
would appear to be a “person” particularly having the potential to be liable 
for secondary infringement with respect to lessons as now specifically set 
out by the Bill:117
amendment being designed “to enable remote students to view the lecture us-
ing networ� technology, either live [that is, synchronous with the delivery of 
the lecture on the premises of the institution] or at a more convenient time [i.e., 
asynchronously].” Asynchronous delivery of a lecture does not seem to be per-
mitted if the lecture is fixed but not delivered via telecommunication but rather 
via other technology. As quoted above, the location in Bill C-60 of the notion of 
accessing a wor� “at a time individually chosen,” that is asynchronously, occurs 
only in the definition of communication to the public by telecommunication in 
the proposed s. .(1)(a).
11 Bill C-60, above note , s. 18 proposing s. 0.01(1).         
115 The heart of the proposed s. 0.01 would otherwise appear to be the exception              
from infringement provided by s. 0.01() which provides :
Subject to subsections () and (), it is not an infringement of copyright for 
an educational institution or a person acting under its authority 
(a) to communicate a lesson to the public by telecommunication, if that pub-
lic consists only of its students enrolled in a course of which the lesson 
forms a part and instructors acting under the authority of the education-
al institution; 
(b) to ma�e a fixation of the lesson… 
(c) to perform any other act that is necessary [for (a) or (b)]. 
116 Bill C-60, above note , s. 18 proposing s. 0.01().         
117 Ibid., s. 15, proposing an amendment to s. 7 of the Copyright Act (above note ) 
by adding subsection (.), quoted here.
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It is an infringement of copyright for any person to do any of the fol-
lowing acts with respect to anything that the person �nows or ought 
to �now is a lesson … or a fixation of one:
(a) to sell it or to rent it out;
(b) to distribute it to such an extent as to prejudicially affect the 
owner of copyright in the wor� or other subject-matter that is 
included in the lesson;
(c) by way of trade, to distribute it, expose or offer it for sale or rent-
al or exhibit it in public;
(d) to possess it for the purpose of doing anything referred to in any 
of paragraphs (a) to (c);
(e) to circumvent any measure ta�en in conformity with paragraph 
0.01()(d)118; or
(f) to communicate it by telecommunications to any person other 
than a person referred to in paragraph 0.01()(a).119
The approach dictated by the educational exceptions for the electronic 
environment in Bill C-60 seems redolent of an old-style pedagogy — one 
in which the instructor pac�ages �nowledge and delivers it, top-down, 
to waiting students. A progressive, participative educational process, in 
which students bring resources which they have located into the class, 
sharing them with other students and with the instructor, does not seem 
to have a place in the vision of education shaping Bill C-60.10 And, indeed, 
the notion of the “lesson” does not seem to add a usefully discriminating 
concept in the context of copyright.
Moreover, again, as in the case of interlibrary loans, given the approach 
of the Supreme Court of Canada to the ambit of fair dealing in Canada, the 
role of intermediaries, and the concept of authorization under the statute, 
the amendments contemplated by the Statement and proposed in Bill C-
118 The “reasonable measures” discussed above, which educational institutions will         
be required to ta�e to limit communication of lessons to students and instruc-
tors and prevent use of lessons after the course has ended.
119 That is, as discussed above, students in the course and instructors in the insti-             
tution.
10 unless a student can be interpreted under this new regime as a person acting              
under the authority of an educational institution, the students have none of the 
exceptions to infringement provided under the new s. 0.01. If it is intended 
that students are to be interpreted as persons acting under the authority of 
the educational institution within this section, it would be better to be explicit 
since, with respect to other aspects of the law, students are not considered to be 
part of their educational institutions.
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60 dealing with performance or display of lectures to students at remote 
sites would seem to be very probably unnecessary.11 It does not seem an 
unreasonable extension of the principles and reasoning annunciated by 
the Supreme Court in the interpretation of the existing fair dealing pro-
visions to paraphrase from the judgment in CCH v. Law Society of Upper 
Canada, replacing research with private study, and focusing on the trans-
mission rather than the reproduction, as follows:
when the [educational institution] ma�es [performances or trans-
missions of lectures containing the copyrighted material for stu-
dents], they do so for the purposes of [private study]. Although the 
[performances or transmissions of the lectures] are not [private 
study] in and of themselves, they are necessary conditions of [private 
study] and thus part of the [private study] process.1
Again, paralleling the observations of the Supreme Court about patrons 
of the custom photocopy delivery service at the Great �ibrary of the �aw 
Society of upper Canada, it surely can be observed equally that 
patrons of [interlibrary loan services and students] cannot reason-
ably be expected to always [collect their interlibrary loan materials 
or attend classes, respectively] on-site [at their library or educational 
institution] … it would be burdensome to expect them to travel to 
the city [or library, campus, or institution] each time they wanted to 
[retrieve a particular interlibrary loan document ordered or to attend 
a given class].…1
Moreover, the Supreme Court too� its position about what was unreason-
able with respect to the facts involved in the transmission of information 
11 Again, as discussed above, fair dealing has been found to encompass situations            
where transmissions “emanated from a single point and were each intended to 
be received at a single point ...”— which is the case with distance learning.
1 It will be recalled from above that the actual text of para. 6 of              CCH v. Law 
Society of Upper Canada (above note ) reads: “when the Great �ibrary staff 
ma�e copies of the requested cases, statutes, excerpts from legal texts and legal 
commentary, they do so for the purpose of research. Although the retrieval 
and photocopying of legal wor�s are not research in and of themselves, they are 
necessary conditions of research and thus part of the research process.”
1 It will be recalled from above that the actual text of para. 69 of              CCH v. Law 
Society of Upper Canada (ibid.) reads: “patrons of the custom photocopying 
service cannot reasonably be expected to always conduct their research on-site 
… it would be burdensome to expect them to travel to the city each time they 
wanted to trac� down a specific source.”
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from the Great �ibrary to its patrons despite the fact that only 0 percent of 
the patrons of the service were in fact located outside the city,1 whereas, in 
the case of interlibrary loan and remote learning in Canada, the proportion 
of inter-city transfers of information is arguably much higher.
4)	 The	Question	of	Electronic	Provision	of	Material	to	
Students	
Students are provided with one protection in the Bill, in the area of tele-
communication of wor�s, but only in respect of situations in which the 
educational institution involved has an agreement with a collective so-
ciety (the proposed section 0.0) and, curiously, not in connection with 
telecommunication of lessons under the proposed section 0.01(where, as 
quoted above, reproduction of the lesson must be prevented). The protec-
tion provided for students is that 
The owner of copyright in a wor� may not recover any damages 
against a student for a single printing of a reproduction in digital 
form of the wor� that was communicated to the student by telecom-
munication if, at the time of the printing, it was reasonable for the 
student to believe that the reproduction had been communicated to 
him or her [legally by an educational institution that has an agree-
ment with a collective society].15
The provision in the Statement relating to the liability of educational in-
stitutions for the electronic delivery to students of materials appeared 
ambiguous. It seemed that the intention was, in effect, that the statute 
would automatically extend electronic rights to an institution when it has 
a reprography agreement in place. It was difficult to understand what in-
stitutions would purchase an additional license for electronic rights under 
these conditions, which seemed disadvantageous to copyright holders. The 
instantiation of these provisions in Bill C-60, on the other hand, appears, 
in fact, to swing the pendulum quite the other way.16 under the approach 
ta�en by the Bill, if a collective society ma�es a license for electronic rights 
in wor�s available, an educational institution cannot avail itself of any 
1 CCH v. Law Society of Upper Canada, above note , at para. 69.
15 Bill C-60, above note , s. 18, creating a new s. 0.0(). The proposed protec-              
tion for students does not extend to protection from injunctive relief sought by 
copyright holders.
16 Ibid., s. 18, proposing s. 0.0.
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of the exceptions provided under statute in the proposed section 0.0, 
whether or not the institution enters into the proffered license.17 
to situate the approaches in the Statement and Bill C-60 in context, 
it must be realized that the “heart and soul” of the existing reprography 
licenses is the indemnity clause. A typical example of such a clause is con-
tained in the Agreement between AccessCopyright and the university of 
western ontario:
CANCoPy shall indemnify and save the �icensee harmless from any 
costs, expenses and damages (including punitive damages) relating 
to any Claim against the �icensee whatsoever and howsoever arising 
from the exercise of rights under this Agreement.…
The rights given are related to “Published wor�s” which are defined in the 
contract to be all publications not listed on the “Exclusions �ist” (and thus 
a more extensive inclusion than just the wor�s in the “Repertoire” which 
is defined in the agreement as being those wor�s to which CANCoPy has 
the Canadian rights).
There is great value in this indemnity clause in the reprographics con-
text for the participating “�icensee” institutions because, while the Ca-
nadian collectives represent a high proportion of domestic rightsholders, 
they cannot represent so high a proportion of foreign rightsholders be-
cause most rightsholders in other jurisdictions are far less collectivized 
than are Canadian rightsholders. Since the copyright in material used 
in Canada is frequently foreign-owned, arguably users buy licenses from 
the Canadian collectives mostly to benefit from the indemnification from 
suits brought against them by those not party to the collective which the 
license ma�es available. 
AccessCopyright, Canada’s largest print collective (representing Eng-
lish language wor�s, and, through a reciprocal agreement with CoPIBEC, 
also representing Canada’s French repertoire), has been wor�ing diligently 
to acquire the rights to administer digital rights for the rightsholders now 
represented by it in the arena of reprography. However, as is evidenced by 
the message on its website, AccessCopyright has not yet been prepared to 
17 Ibid., s. 18, proposing s. 0.0(7): “Subsections (1) to (6) do not apply in respect 
of a wor� if the educational institution can obtain from a collective society a 
license authorizing the acts permitted under paragraphs (1)(a) and (b) with 
respect to the repertoire of wor�s of the society that includes the wor� in ques-
tion ….”
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issue blan�et licenses with respect to digital rights.18 Although the ability 
to offer such licenses remains a goal, such licenses have not progressed 
beyond drafts and are not available to users.19 Those wishing to acquire 
digital rights from AccessCopyright must do so on a transactional basis 
and only for those wor�s for which AccessCopyright has succeeded in ac-
quiring control of the digital rights.
one may speculate that the business decision for AccessCopyright and 
other Canadian collectives contemplating offering blan�et licenses in the 
electronic environment is the potential cost of including the indemnity 
clause which the purchasers of the reprography licenses have come to ex-
pect. If the collectives do not represent, with respect to electronic rights, 
what they consider to be an acceptable number of copyright holders, pre-
sumably on a worldwide basis, the indemnity clause expected by potential 
purchasing institutions is going to represent too much ris� for the prices 
those Canadian user institutions are going to be willing to pay.
As well, in considering the proposed amendments respecting electronic 
delivery of materials to students, it would seem that the Supreme Court’s 
vision of fair dealing already would not encompass the wholesale distribu-
tion of copyrighted wor�s to users, electronically or otherwise: the Court 
specifically placed the caveat on the faxing of wor�s that if a series of faxes 
were to be sent between the same two points, that “might constitute an in-
fringement of an owner’s right to communicate to the public.” Similarly, it 
would seem to follow that a whole course pac�, which would have required 
licenses (or the protection of a blan�et license with AccessCopyright) if 
reproduced in paper form, would not be able to be posted to an intranet or 
Internet site without either license or other permissions, under the guise 
of fair dealing.
with the Robertson v. Thomson case, discussed above, still before the 
Supreme Court of Canada, it seems too early to bring legislative change to 
this area. Moreover — assuming that the Supreme Court of Canada main-
18 “AccessCopyright does, however, offer digital licences on a transactional basis,          
to cover some digital uses of wor�s in its repertoire. This may include scanning 
(ta�ing a print wor� and digitizing it), importing a wor� from a digital form to 
a print form and ta�ing a digital wor� and using it in a different digital format. 
to determine whether the wor� you wish to license is available for these various 
digital uses, go to the Rights Management System (RMS), (AccessCopyright 
<www.accesscopyright.ca/licenses.asp?a=10>.)
19 The goal has been articulated by Cancopy representatives for several years.           
That such blan�et licenses have not yet been made available was confirmed by 
telephone communication with AccessCopyright as recently as �une, 005.
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tains the position ta�en by the courts below, that the electronic repro-
duction rights are separate from other rights — if through the proposed 
amendments, the Canadian government effectively merges the value of 
the electronic rights in wor�s with the value of the reproduction rights, it 
would certainly seem to affect the rights of foreign rightsholders in a way 
that would create the li�elihood of a challenge under NAFTA or TRIPS. 
Even considering only the position of domestic rights holders, it seems 
premature to provide for rights such as those contained in the proposed 
section 0.0 in the electronic environment when there is no parallel pro-
vision proposed for the offline reprographic world. Again, such an incon-
sistency would seem difficult to defend.
5)	 Are	“Educational	and	Research	Access	Issues”	the	
Same	as	Issues	about	the	“Educational	Use	of	Publicly	
Available	Internet	Material”?	
In indicating that the Government is declining to initiate specific legisla-
tive reform in the area of the educational use of Internet material, the 
Statement says that “[e]ducators see� an exemption from copyright liabil-
ity for use for educational purposes of Internet material which is “publicly 
available.” The Statement defines “publicly available” material as being 
“generally understood to be material in respect of which the rights holder 
does not see� compensation for use.”10 The Statement goes on:
However, there is disagreement as to what material on the Internet is 
to be considered “publicly available” and which uses are to be permit-
ted. Rights holders also want to encourage use of the Internet in an 
educational context, but to do so through licensing approaches.
“The challenge” declares the Statement, in this context of the Internet as 
a resource for students and teachers, “is how to ensure a copyright frame-
wor� that will facilitate Internet use in the classroom in a manner that will 
not unreasonably impair the rights of copyright owners.” This challenge is 
10 This is a less elaborate definition than that proposed in the 00            Interim Report, 
above note 7, Recommendation 5:
material that is available on public Internet sites (sites that do not require 
subscriptions or passwords and for which there is no associated fee or 
technological protection measures which restrict access or use) and is ac-
companied by notice from the copyright owner explicitly consenting that 
the material can be used without prior payment or permission. 
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so great and the issue so “complex and contentious” that the Government 
“believes it requires further public input and consideration”11 whereas is-
sues surrounding the use of “networ� technologies such as the Internet 
to deliver classroom instruction and material to students remotely” and 
electronic inter-library loan are presumably less challenging, and statu-
tory solutions have been intimated in the Statement.1 
First, given the definition of “publicly available” which is put forward 
by the Government in the Statement, it is puzzling why the Government 
would worry about contemplating legislative reform with respect to such 
material. If the definition of “publicly available” is that permission has 
been given by the rightsholder for the proposed use, there is no need for 
law reform: the rightsholder has exercised her right in favour of giving 
public access.
Second, the Government is prepared to allow wor�s in copyright to be 
copied from any source, which could apparently include wor�s accessed 
from the Internet, used in a lecture by means of a hand drawing or an 
overhead projector or similar device (which it can be argued would include 
a data projector displaying wor�s retrieved online) and then disseminated 
to remote students via technology — which the Statement endorses as 
a direction in which it hopes to move. But from the perspective of the 
functional use of information in educational institutions, it is difficult 
to distinguish this conceptually from downloading, reproducing, and 
transmitting material “to students and teachers for the purposes of as-
signments, lessons and research,” which the Government reports is too 
complex and contentious to address. 
while the Government had expressed uncertainty in the Statement 
about whether the downloading, reproducing, and transmitting of Inter-
net material by students and teachers for the purposes of assignments, 
lessons, and research was a permitted use, whatever the eventual decision 
of the Supreme Court in Robertson v. Thomson, it would seem that, rather 
than being so uncertain as the Government articulates, teachers and stu-
dents have rights in this area. teachers already have the right to download 
and reproduce material for their own needs in underta�ing pedagogical 
and bac�ground research, as an element of fair dealing. Similarly, stu-
11 The 00  Interim Report, above note 7, called for extended collective licensing 
in this context: Recommendation . The Committee did, however, state that 
“Such a licensing regime must recognize that the collective should not apply a 
fee to publicly available material:” Recommendation .
1 Statement, above note , at para. 15.      
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dents would appear to have the ability to download and reproduce mate-
rial for their own private study (again, fair dealing). Following upon the 
reasoning of the Supreme Court in CCH v. Law Society of Upper Canada, 
it would appear eminently reasonable that teachers could act as agents 
for students in facilitating their access to materials they need for private 
study, just as the Court found librarians act as agents for patrons in the 
exercise of the patrons’ research uses. In any event, if, as it has in Bill C-
60, the Government ventures into the arena of the electronic delivery of 
material to students which would otherwise be delivered in paper form 
under reprography licenses, it is difficult to see the issues raised thereby as 
different from those which are raised in considering the transmission of 
electronic material to students for the purposes of assignments, lessons, 
and research, from which the Government has said it is shying away.
There is another concern with the Government’s indications that it in-
tends to push ahead with amendments permitting remote students using 
networ� technology to view lectures either live or at a more convenient 
time, while reserving other technology issues involving digital communi-
cation for further consideration. It may be that the proposed amendment 
involving distance learning will create unanticipated challenges. The brief 
commentary in the Statement, for example, does not indicate an aware-
ness that the exception contemplated to allow remote students to view the 
lecture later may involve a performer’s performance right in the lecturer’s 
performance of the lecture.1 
It is asserted at the beginning of the Statement that it is a public policy 
principle underlying the Copyright Act that “the Act be drafted, to the ex-
tent possible, in technologically neutral terms.” However, an exception 
stating that students may view lectures which include copyrighted mate-
rials at a more convenient time — namely, a time other than contempora-
neous with the live delivery of the lecture — only if networ� technology is 
used is not consistent with the principle of technological neutrality. why 
should the exception not also include an exception for videotapes of lec-
tures made available for students who were unwell and not in attendance 
at the lecture? 
1 Copyright Act, above note , s. 15(1), including in s. 15(1)(a), for a live performance, 
the right to communicate the performer’s performance to the public by telecom-
munication and s. 15(1)(b) if the lecture is fixed in order to be shown asynchro-
nously later. See also the definition of “performer’s performance” in s. .
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The suggestion of the Council of Ministers of Education1 to deal with 
the application of copyright exemptions to the environment of distance 
learning would have been to amend the definition of “educational institu-
tion” rather than to create new categories of exceptions. Such an amend-
ment would appear to have the advantage of technological neutrality that 
the Government has said that it see�s but which it seems to have difficulty 
achieving if the approach in the Statement and Bill C-60 is adopted.
		6)	Should	All	Educational	Institutions,	Libraries,	
Archives,	and	Museums	Enjoy	the	Same			Exceptions?	
The Supreme Court of Canada has spo�en repeatedly of users’ rights, not 
merely of exceptions to the rights of rightsholders. From this perspective, 
it seems difficult to justify giving users greater or lesser access based upon 
the ownership of the entity from whom the access is sought. This is the 
more obvious in an era of increasing public-private sector partnership. 
Surely user resources should not be dependent upon whether they choose 
to access them through the public sector or non-profit partner or the for-
profit partner; the more so as the public and private sectors are increas-
ingly integrated in the delivery of services to Canadians.
It is true that the Supreme Court which decided the CCH v. Law Society 
of Upper Canada and “tariff ” cases is a composition of the Court which 
no longer exists; however, a majority of the court remains.15 Despite the 
loss of two judges from that Court,16 Canada is fortunate that its Supreme 
Court has been, and continues to be, relatively experienced in intellectual 
1 Council of Ministers of Education, Canada, “Statement on Copyright from the           
Following Provinces and territories: Alberta, British Columbia, Manitoba, New 
Brunswic�, Newfoundland, Northwest territories, Nova Scotia, ontario, Prince 
Edward Island, Sas�atchewan, yu�on” (February 1995). <www.cmec.ca/copyright/
stat-eng.htm>, s. 1, Definition of Educational Institution.
15 �ustice �ouise Arbour left the court in late �une of 00, having accepted the              
nomination from Secretary General Kofi Annan to become united Nations High 
Commissioner for Human Rights.  �ustice Fran� Iacobucci also left the Court in 
�une 00, ostensibly loo�ing forward to retirement, but actually to step into 
the responsibilities of the Presidency of the university of toronto on an interim 
basis. �ustices Rosalie Abella and �ouise Charron have replaced them. �ustice 
�ohn Major has signaled his intention to retire from the Court.
16 of whom �ustice Fran� Iacobucci, in particular, had considerable past experi-          
ence in intellectual property matters, having wor�ed in the late 1980s on cases 
in the patent area, in particular. �ustice Iacobucci was also later on the Federal 
Court, where he heard at least thirteen intellectual property cases and was 
Chief �ustice for two years.
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property law decision-ma�ing and practice.17 It appears unli�ely that the 
Court will bac� away from the strong stand it has ta�en on a “users’ rights” 
perspective which it insists must be considered on balance with the rights 
of copyrightholders.
F.	 CONCLUSION
Rather than continuing to distinguish between the rights to be made avail-
able to users based on the ownership of the institution from which the users 
have sought information, the Government should consider all educational 
institutions and libraries and archives and museums based on their func-
tions. to do otherwise appears inconsistent with the conversation about us-
ers’ rights now firmly entrenched in the Supreme Court of Canada. 
The proposed amendments for enabling remote students to view a 
lecture using networ� technology and permitting the electronic des�top 
delivery of material directly to an interlibrary loan patron seem unneces-
sary given the parameters of the existing fair dealing exception described 
by the Supreme Court of Canada — and the requirements for reasonable 
and effective safeguards seem an impractical and unreasonable burden on 
these institutions, one which the Supreme Court has indicated that ISPs 
do not have to shoulder.
The proposal for permitting the electronic delivery of material covered 
by an educational institution’s blan�et reprography licence with a collec-
tive society, “unless the licence in question provides for such delivery,” is, 
at best, ill-timed. The issues it is apparently meant to address are indistin-
guishable from those the Government has chosen not to address at this 
time. As operationalized by Bill C-60, the idea appears to be trying to force 
the collective administration of rights in this area beyond the scope of cer-
tainty currently available in terms of the business model being developed 
by the collectives and the �nown limits of the rights involved.18
17 Chief �ustice Mc�achlin, for example, handled several important intellectual         
property cases during her sojourn on the Supreme Court of British Columbia, 
as well as acting as counsel on at least one reported case from the 1970s. �ustice 
Binnie practiced intellectual property litigation extensively, particularly in the 
patent area, while with the law firm of McCarthy tetrault. Many of the other 
�ustices have heard intellectual property cases while on their respective pro-
vincial court benches. Amongst more recent appointments to the Court, �ustice 
Deschamps has experience in practice as counsel in the trademar� area. 
18 In the 00   Interim Report (above note 7, at Recommendation 6), the Com-
mittee advocated a collective administration solution to all the problems of 
technology-enhanced learning:
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The users’ rights language of the Supreme Court of Canada is strong, 
rights-based language and offers a powerful alternative to the potential 
tyranny of rightsholders’ interests signaled by the mandatory language 
in the Berne Convention, NAFTA, and TRIPS agreements. The Government 
may wish to bear in mind that a strong connection may be drawn between 
the rights-based language of the Supreme Court of Canada in this area 
and the right to freedom of expression, including rights to access informa-
tion, under section (b) of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms.19
The Committee recommends that the Government of Canada put in place a 
regime of extended collective licensing to ensure that educational institu-
tions’ use of information and communications technologies to deliver copy-
right protected wor�s can be more efficiently licensed. 
 Although, again, the Committee applied the caveat: “Such a licensing regime 
must recognize that the collective should not apply a fee to publicly available 
material.” (Recommendation 6). while the Committee’s solution may not be 
appropriate, its attitude toward all technology-enhanced learning as requiring 
one consistent approach seems wiser than the piecemeal approach the Govern-
ment is attempting in the Statement (above note ) and Bill C-60 (above note ).
19 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act 1982, be-
ing Schedule B to The Canada Act 1982 (u.K.), 198, c.11, <http://laws.justice.
gc.ca/en/charter/>. It is not possible to definitively predict the outcome of a 
Charter challenge to legislation which upsets the balance between the rights of 
copyright holders and users now delineated by the Supreme Court of Canada; 
and a full analysis is the subject of another article. However, the language of 
the Court in recent copyright decisions flags the possibility of a constitutional 
chec� on Parliament’s ability to diminish user rights in the name of compliance 
with trade obligations that favour rightsholders’ rights over access.
